On August 19, 1861
Governor of Kentucky Beriah Magoffin wrote a letter to President Lincoln urging
to allow Kentucky to stay neutral during the war. A similar letter was sent to Confederate
President Davis a couple of months before, but now Lincoln had called for the creation
of a recruitment center at Camp Dick Robinson in Garrard County. Magoffin
expressed that Kentuckians had “…resisted
no law, rebelled against no authority, engaged in no revolution, but constantly
proclaimed their firm determination to pursue their peaceful avocations…”[1]
Magoffin feared that Kentucky would only become a battleground for
opposing armies and he was certain that there was no need of Federal protection.
Magoffin never mentioned Camp Dick Robinson by name, but did “urge the removal
from the limits of Kentucky of military force now organized and in camp within
the State.”[1]
He called for prompt action to preserve the peace of Kentucky.
Magoffin, though a
states’ rights and slavery supporter, vowed to take the citizens of Kentucky’s
stance on the issue of secession. At one time he even wrote all southern
governors with a plan to avoid war, but after it was unheeded, he supported
John Crittenden’s compromise attempts. After a vote in the General Assembly,
Kentucky was to remain neutral.
The letter to Lincoln
seems genuine in intent and very respectful to the president, but Magoffin
brings to attention the fact that there had been an army raised without the
“consent or advice of the authorities of
the State, and without consultation with those most prominent known and
recognized as loyal citizens.”[1] If
Lincoln wanted Kentucky to remain loyal, it would seem that he would have kept
Governor Magoffin informed about new military camps, especially the first Union
camp south of the Ohio River. However, Kentucky legislators supported Lincoln’s
actions, and Kentucky voters put a majority of Union supporters in the General
Assembly that continued to go against Magoffin’s attempts at neutrality.
On August 24, Lincoln
wrote Governor Magoffin in return that he believed that there was a military
camp formed in Kentucky, but he admits that his knowledge might not be
accurate. Lincoln told Magoffin that he believed that it was a small force, not
currently growing in number, furnished arms by the US army, and consisted of
only local citizens. Furthermore, Lincoln believed to be acting in the interest
of the majority of Union supporters in Kentucky. Lincoln assured Magoffin that
he had spoken with many Kentuckians, including Congressman, and no one except
Magoffin had called for a removal of troops. The force actually numbered over
3000 and was highly armed. Lincoln averted any opposition from Magoffin by simply
going on with his own plans. Even though this was a risky move by Lincoln, it
proved to be wise.
Lincoln closed his
letter by respectfully declining to remove troops or close the camp because it
was the popular wish of Kentucky to keep it open. We may never know what the
popular wishes of Kentucky citizens were since state legislatures in Frankfort
refused to allow the state to vote on secession. We do know that over half of
the counties sent delegates to Bowling Green to vote for secession a couple of
months later. Magoffin’s plans for neutrality had fallen through on both
fronts. Even the conclusion to Lincoln’s letter questioned Magoffin’s intention
by stating, “It is with regret I search for, and can not find, in your not very
short letter, any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for
the preservation of the Federal Union.”[2]
Magoffin was faced with a General Assembly that overruled his every veto, a
president that refused to listen or ask for advice concerning matters within
his state, and a Confederate Army that went against his wishes by deploying
troops on neutral soil as well. With no other choice, Magoffin resigned with
the stipulation that he would choose his successor.
Lincoln and Magoffin’s
relationship, judging by their exchange of letters, seems to have a shell of
respect covering a core of distrust. Lincoln was going to have his way by
drawing Kentucky into the war and he was willing to risk angering the
neutrality supporters in doing so. Kentucky proved to be a key state to hold and
the breaking of neutrality did not anger the citizens as much as the
Emancipation Proclamation did later. Magoffin, after the war, showed his true
loyalty to the Union by promoting civil rights and passage of the 13th
amendment.
[1] “The Neutrality
of Kentucky; Important Correspondence Between Gov. Magoffin and President Lincoln”
The New York Times September 7, 1861. Repost of Magoffin’s August 19, 1861
letter to Lincoln.
[2] “The Neutrality
of Kentucky; Important Correspondence Between Gov. Magoffin and President Lincoln”
The New York Times September 7, 1861. Repost of Lincoln’s August 24, 1861
letter to Magoffin.
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