Reconstructing Relations: The United States & Great Britain

During the Civil War, the Union and Great Brain were on uneasy terms due to a number of actions on behalf of the European country that skirted the lines of allegiance and interference. I chose to examine Reconstruction and the Constitution, 1866-1876 by John William Burgess, a political scientist, in which he details the United States’ tenuous relations with Great Britain during the Reconstruction period. Given the political doggedness of both countries it is not surprising to me that they required over ten years beyond the end of the Civil War to fully reconcile their grievances.

Immediately following the war, the Union, newly reunited, was eager to set to rights these perceived wrongdoings on the part of Great Britain. “There were many who favored turning the great military power with which the United States emerged from the Civil War against Great Britain,” says Burgess, “forcing a settlement of those difficulties by the trial of arms.” However, Burgess continues by saying that William Seward, remaining “in the direction of the foreign affairs of the Union,” was wholly opposed to the idea. Rather, he hoped that Great Britain’s parliamentary election of 1867 would make possible a peaceful resolution. It did (Burgess 302-303).

With a peaceful resolution in sight, the United States was then eager to receive from Great Britain acknowledgement and compensation adequate for their accused wrongdoings. Among those wrongdoings was their unofficial involvement in Confederate blockade running, a topic that I discussed in my previous blog entry. Specifically, they spited the Union and its naval blockade on the South by encouraging the Confederacy’s continued exportation of cotton, offering in exchange the means for the Confederacy to prolong the war. In the eyes of the United States, this cost the Union lives and resources.

The United States felt strongly about the matter and it was reflected in their attitude toward reconciliation – their demands for acknowledgement and compensation were received with a startled reproach by Great Britain. Subsequently, both sides expected an unreasonable amount of leeway from each other. By 1870, nothing of substance had been accomplished and relations remained anxious. Then, the United States invited Great Britain to jointly form a High Commission whose sole responsibility was to draft a fair and lasting solution (Burgess 302-307).

The High Commission completed the Treaty of Washington in 1871. The treaty called for a tribunal of five arbitrators – two to represent the United States and Great Britain, and three to represent the Italian King, the Swiss Confederation, and the Emperor of Brazil – to judge by majority rule the United States’ claims against Great Britain (Burgess 307-308). Ultimately, after months of deliberation, dissatisfaction and counterarguments, the tribunal found Great Britain to be at fault in a number of claims and awarded the United States “fifteen millions five hundred thousand dollars in gold” (Burgess 317). The tribunal would continue to weigh subsequent matters of United States-Great Britain relations until 1878 (Burgess 322).

With the United States and Great Britain being fast allies today, it is interesting to see how differently things could have gone, considering the circumstances. In his book, Burgess says that Russia was very supportive of the Union, having “threatened interference in behalf of the Union against interference in behalf of the Confederacy by any other European state” (Burgess 300). Would Russia have aided the Union in the event of more outward support of the Confederacy by Great Britain? Is it possible that Russia’s threat of interference, in part, dissuaded Great Britain from increased involvement in the war? Additionally, Burgess says, “with German armies encamped around Paris and throughout France, the affairs of Continental Europe were too unsettled and precarious for Great Britain to run the risk of any serious complications with the United States” (Burgess 306). Were circumstances different, might Great Britain have officially supported the Confederacy?

Regardless of what may have been, the process the United States and Great Britain undertook to reconcile their differences was certainly tenuous and not without the danger of a falling-out. Their ability to see the process through to the end despite their stubborn tendencies is a testament to the lasting bond that the countries have shared ever since.

Burgess, John W. Reconstruction and the Constitution, 1866-1876. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1902. 300-322. Print.