Tuesday, April 30, 2013

Everyman's War: A Rich and Poor Man's Fight in Lee's Army



During the American Civil War, the economic situations in the USA and CSA were comparable. Both nations found it difficult to fund the war effort and stretched the value of each dollar spent. Like every other war time effort in American History, there have been “the movers and the shakers”, the “big wigs”, and “the power houses” who could support the war effort or the government with which their loyalty lay. The historic saying that war is a rich man’s cause but a poor man’s fight comes to mind while reading an article published in the Civil War History journal in Volume 54, Number 3, September 2008.
                Joseph T. Glatthaar writes “In this Confederate war for independence, the rich man not only advocated the cause, he embraced it. Disproportionately high numbers of wealthy Confederates enlisted, remained in the ranks in spite of hardships and suffered more heavily on the battlefield” (Glatthaar, 2008). He goes on to say “…the rich and the sons of the rich enlisted in the army, incurred the risks, and fought desperately, right alongside their poorer comrades” (Glatthaar, 2008). These quotes serve to show that no matter the societal rank held in society during peace time or in their prior civilian lives, the wealthy man was a dedicated to the cause as anyone in the South.  Glatthaar puts forth the idea that many of the deserting Confederate soldiers may have done so, not because they lost faith in the cause, but because they did not have much worth fighting for since most were too poor to own slaves in the first place and had larger commitments at home to attend to.
                The article is an interesting read and makes one realize that there are lesser known and discussed events, which are just as interesting, during the war rather than the now-famous battles we are taught in school.


Glatthaar, Joseph T. “Everyman’s War: A Rich and Poor Man’s Fight in Lee’s Army” Civil War History. Vol               54. No. 3 (2008): 229-246. Web.

War Upon the Land: Nature as an Agent to War.

   If asked early in the semester what topics I expected to cover through the duration of this class; I would have said the obvious, such as military campaigns, political ploys, social standards, and prominent figures among other topics. However, I did not expect to focus on the nature of the land as a physical agent to military strategy in the South. Quite simply it is not the first thing that comes to mind when preparing for a discussion about the chaos that was, Civil War and Reconstruction. Needless to say; the topic that “War Upon the Land” places focus on is certainly worthy of attention and discussion.

   Within the same frame of time that war upon the American homeland commenced; the nation had taken to measures that tried to tame nature in a way. For instance dams were being built to control waterways as a means of shipment of goods; the Transcontinental Railroad would change the way travelers viewed time in relation to their travels, and farmers would become reliant upon taming the land for the production of their crops. It serves as no surprise that the premise of Brady’s book would consist of measures taken by those in war to use the land against their opposition. 

   Use of the land by the South did not necessarily have to involve any real work as opposed to the North. The Confederate army was without a doubt familiar to the land, and in a sense had a home field advantage. One could only imagine the struggles for union soldiers had in dealing with the terrain of the South. A track through the swampland's would be enough to deprive an army of many resources  and indeed it did. As for actually using the land intentionally for benefit to their cause; it was the Union who would cause a literal “War Upon the Land” as a maneuver to starve out their Confederate combatants. Home field advantage would really be no advantage at all if you are unable to have adequate supplies or food. Sherman's "March to the Sea" is the a prime example of how the Union destroyed land in the South as a means to deprive the Confederacy of important needs during their military campaigns. 
   
   In the future, when discussing the impact of military conflict; I will now understand to include this specific aspect of the war into my writings and discussions. It illustrates not only an advantage of the Confederate Army, but also its demise in some forms. Brady illustrates how man can alter nature for its benefit, while also not undermining natures importance to us all. 

Monday, April 29, 2013

Nate Back's diatribe on War Upon the Land

Of all the content featured in War Upon the Land by Lisa Brady, chapter four really stood out for me.  This chapter caught my eye mostly due to the fact that I have become something of an expert on William T. Sherman and the Savannah Campaign.  As far as content, its informative to a certain degree.  One thing that I had some trouble with was her use of the word “chevauchee.” Sherman’s campaign resembled the chevauchee tactic, but it was not an authentic chevauchee.  Sherman did not wantonly kill civilians nor did he authorize rape, which was very common in the chevauchees of the Hundred Years War.  Personally, I like the term “new chevauchee”, a phrase used by Mark Grimsley in his 1995 book The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865.  Grimsley drew a clear line between the “old” chevauchee and the “new” chevauchee.  A critical difference between the old and the new is the attack on churches.  During the Hundred Years War, Edward III ordered churches to be burned while Sherman explicitly had churches defended during his occupation of Atlanta.  But I essence, Sherman did carry out a chevauchee, but for all indented purposes, it is best to draw a line between the chevauchee of the Hundred Years War and the chevauchee of the March to the Sea.  I feel that Grimsley’s book would make a good supplement to Brady’s book or even a good replacement book.  In terms of content, Grimsley was more interesting.  The Hard Hand of War reads like Oliver Stone presents War Upon the Land.  I found Brady’s book to portray the events of the March to the Sea to be boring.  After months of mulling over primary sources (mostly Sherman’s Memoirs and Marching With Sherman by Henry Hitchcock) and especially Southern Storm: Sherman’s March to the Sea by Noah Andrew Trudeau, the events of the campaign was not that boring.  Personally, I found my sources to be very interesting and I lost 2-3 hours a day getting captivated by the events of the march.  As a whole, I found this section to be helpful for someone researching agricultural history, but in regards to military and agricultural history I would recommend The Hard Hand of War by Mark Grimsley.  As far as Sherman information in a secondary source goes, Southern Storm is probably one of the best you can get.  


Grimsley, Mark. The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians,
1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Trudeau, Noah Andrew. Southern Storm: Sherman’s March to the Sea. New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 2008. 



Saturday, April 27, 2013

From Successor to Predecessor: General Grant Writes President Johnson

Following the death of Abraham Lincoln, the question of Reconstruction in post-Civil War America was in flux. New President Andrew Johnson, a former slaveholder from Tennessee, was on surface a very stark contrast from the Illinois lawyer. While he initially appeared to a Republican Congress, Radicals even, as a potentially compatible partner, Johnson progressively began to fulfill his surface appearance as Southern sympathizer throughout his time in office. However his administration may be viewed historically after the fact, it appears that Johnson's understanding of how to approach Reconstruction was blossoming at first. Because of this, he decided to inquire about alternative views.

During the first year of his tenure, the President was under the influence of a series of informants that traveled through the South and observed its conditions, offering advice for Reconstruction policy. Among these informants were Radicals Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase and former major general Carl Schurz, along with those he found general agreement with like longtime friend Harvey Watterson and New York Times writer Benjamin Truman. While each of these men represented a certain strict political bias, their letters certainly demonstrating such, Johnson had another correspondent that was slightly more moderate: his successor to the presidency and Civil War hero, Ulysses S. Grant. 

For a long time, outside of his excursions at war, Grant was something of an apolitical figure. Following the war, with intense deliberations of how to execute the reconstruction of the South, Grant kept his image and political views absent from the public sphere. However, at the request of his superior, Grant journeyed through the defeated South and reported his examination of the torn region. 

Though a candidate of the Republican Party, Grant was no Radical. He was a man completely dedicated to the Union and its preservation, adhering to traditional American political values such as self-government. While he was concerned with the prosperity of freedmen, Grant was also concerned with the prosperity of white Southerners, who he believed were key to a functioning restored United States. In his letter to Johnson, these truths are readily apparent. 

Grant was very optimistic at the prospects of a peaceful reunion of these culturally distant regions, noting that he was "satisfied that the mass of thinking men of the south accept present situation of affairs in good faith," while also showing his military bias, declaring that "the highest tribunal -- arms" had settled the debate over secession. Grant still understands that the process of Reconstruction, and the restoration of a peaceful Union, was not entirely over. He concedes that the majority of the Southern population are not prepared to "yield ready obedience" to the traditional government, and that military occupation was still required. Displaying a more moderate view of the post-war South, Grant concludes that both whites and blacks need occupation for safety. He does, however, believe that black regiments should be withdrawn from the region, for purposes of curtailing needless controversy and disorder. "It is not the thinking man who would use violence toward any class of troops sent among them... but the ignorant... might," writes Grant, continuing his trend of separating certain segments of Southern society between those who are prepared for the post-war reality and those who are not. 

Grant also shows a fairly traditional view of economics, and how economics relates with the newly free black population. In his lengthy advice against the occupation of black troops in the South, Grant declares that their presence "demoralizes labor" because they offered a safe haven for disgruntled former slaves that were unwilling to work for whites again. He also discusses how black troops have no regard for white property, believing that they are the true proprietors of the land they once worked. Grant acknowledges this as a wrong, displaying his ambivalence toward the redistribution of wealth in the South to freedmen.

After discussing the benefits of the Freedmen's Bureau in finding employment for blacks, Grant notes that he is "sorry to say that the freedman's mind does not seem to be disabused of the idea that a freedman has the right to live without care or provision for the future." This was certainly pleasing to Johnson, who had recently put an end to any hope for a such a measure. Grant seems to think of slavery as a part of the past, and he seems very content with that proposition, however he does seem to consider the less apparent consequences of that institution. The general longs for a return to a somewhat traditional status of labor in the South, and hopes that blacks will accept their employment under whites like whites have accepted the freedom of blacks. 

Throughout the letter, it becomes very clear that Grant's philosophy toward Reconstruction is that it must be a process of reconciliation. "Southern whites are anxious for a return to self-government," writes Grant, yet he believes that "commingling" is quite impractical considering the circumstances. Here, Grant demonstrates a willingness to appease Southern white culture, in hopes that it will stimulate a lost patriotism. This seems to be indicative of his later campaign platform of "let us have peace." Grant is highly motivated to put the war in the past, moving forward without too much regard for lingering tensions which create a chaotic political atmosphere. It would be that Grant's beliefs would come to fruition with Reconstruction ending abruptly without significant change in Southern culture, and that lack of change being very real with the prominent subjugation of blacks in the region up until the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s.

Grant, Ulysses S. "Letter to Andrew Johnson" in Advice After Appomattox: Letters to Andrew Johnson, 1865-1866, ed. Brooks D. Simpson, Leroy P. Graf, John Muldowny (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987), 212.





The Inconsistencies of Leadership and the Affect on Black Politics


As I thought about Reconstruction and the effects of it. I found perhaps the most interesting thing about Reconstruction is the political side of the free blacks. The political window during Reconstruction was open and the blacks took advantage of it, but just as quickly as it had opened they were back to maybe not quite as bad off as they were but were pushed back out of politics.
As we look in the book, Reconstruction, by Eric Foner, you see how quickly blacks came to power, and because of the power of the white population in the South and the twisting of some legal documents, they were pushed out. For example only three years after the war had ended in 1868, Foner describes one of the first attempts to push blacks out of politics. “Democrats moved to expel black members of the state legislature, on the ground that Georgia’s new constitution failed to guarantee their right to hold office.” And despite the opposition of the Governor, the motion carried in Georgia. This is just one example of how quickly they were forced out. It was almost like the slaves were given a taste of the political power they could have(even though it was still limited) and it was jerked away from them just as quickly. Which in my opinion, to give them a taste of hope and take it back would drive them to push even harder, which inevitably led to the Civil Rights movement in the 20th century. 
Another aspect you can look at this is through the eyes of the the Northern world. in the newspaper article from November 10, 1985 in New York World, the author talks about just how important Johnson presidency is. the article was discussing what exactly was going to happen between Johnson and the Republicans, “It is for Republicans to say whether they will fight out on the negro suffrage line, or frankly accept the policy of the President.” The blacks political involvement had to be dealt with whether one way or the other. So we see that not only was this an issue in the South but in the North as well.
Perhaps the biggest mistake of Reconstruction was the inconsistencies in the way the blacks were treated. At first the blacks were allowed to vote and some were even placed in office but the government and Johnson faltered in their decision making, they pushed back out and restricted by various laws and regulations and just pure fear. What would have happened if it would have just started out like that? That window of freedom to me was very interesting because it gave the blacks hope they never had before, a lot like when they were given land but then it was ordered to be given back to the white southerners. 
Going back to the article, you can see alot of this has to do with Johnson’s leadership, “...yet he will receive the thanks of the entire South for standing out so manfully against those who wish to degrade us by forcing negro suffrage upon us, and will be sustained by those everywhere who have the good of the country at heart.” This is a very telling line because it shows just how little help the freed slaves would really have under this President. Sure they were free but they would not be given suffrage or anything of that sort. 
In conclusion, the inconsistencies of the way black suffrage, and blacks in government were handled is very profound. Depending on who was in leadership, some blacks were able to achieve some sort of political power. However, the end of Reconstruction only showed freed blacks still as powerless as before politically.

Sources:

Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877(New York: Harper & Row, 1988)


Donna L. Dickerson, The Reconstruction Era: Primary Documents on Events from 1865 to 1877 (Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing 2003) 29-30.

Defiant to the End

The U.S. civil war was a time of great strife for both the Union and the Confederacy and during the four years of war that tore the U.S. apart hundreds of thousands of men lost their lives defending what they perceived to be liberty. When the dust has settled and the dream that was the Confederacy is but ash in the wind, one might think that some epiphany of error might cross the minds of the southern generals after their defeat and many of the truths which were held about both slavery and the strength of the south were proven false. However as demonstrated by Richard Taylor, formerly a prominent general of the confederate army, by relaying his views in his memoirs their is no such thoughts of any such errors in judgement and the belief is only that a once proud and noble nation is brought low by the ravishing's of an unforgiving and pitiless tyrant nation.

At the foremost of the injustices that have fallen on the fair southern country side in the wake of their defeat is the "carpet baggers" which Taylor describes in great philosophical detail often pulling both historical and biblical references to describe the transgressions committed by these raggle-tailed guttersnipes. The carpet baggers are the true pestilence upon the land and they are spurred onward by the radicals that hold sway in congress and have no interest in returning to the peace held before the war. Through the writings of Taylor, he makes it clear that he believes that the only end to madness that continues to both slander, because the horrors did not end on the country side and the press baselessly claim that slavery was the only cause of the war to destroy southern credibility in the north and abroad, and besmurtch the former mighty confederacy is when such radicals have left office. Though he viewed him as a closed minded and hot blooded man, as he was a self-made and educated man and thus lacked the poise and articulation that formally educated gentlemen posses, he regarded Johnson's presidency with general good feeling because he attempted to continue some of the practices of Lincoln, whom he held in high regard, and reign in the howling, foaming, maniacs that rule congress and continue to plunder the south's treasures, to slake their own boundless greed.

The next area which was of great concern to Richard Taylor, was the state of the black population that remained in the south. The emancipated blacks were little more then children in Taylor's eyes but he personally held them no ill will and strongly favored education of the blacks. He felt it a foolish notion to elevate the blacks to the same standing as the white, because he was without doubt a white supremacist, but he saw no reason to return to slavery as that was not even possible after the war. The true horror was committed by the southern whites who killed blacks whenever they could find them and though these actions should be condemned, the men that commit them are but sad wretches as well and were only filled with anger because of the injustice enacted upon them by the tyrannical nation which knows no mercy in victory. Though he would be viewed as a very enlightened southerner for his time Taylor was a firm believer that the root of all the problems was that the former Confederate statesmen were being disallowed to retake their seats and govern the south in the southern way and under their guidance the blacks would be happier too.

Through his memoirs Richard Taylor has demonstrated that the south and its former slave holding aristocracy is nothing if it is not stubborn. With the blood of tens of thousands of Unions soldiers red upon their hands, they cannot be but awe-stricken by the reprisal of their conqueror. The myth of the lost cause took root almost the moment the Confederacy lost the war because the south will remain defiant to the last and war will garner no guidance to the men that direct them because the pride of such men will not allow for lessons from the dead, because such lessons might lead to the acknowledgement of guilt and that all the water in the sea could not scrub the blood from their hands.






Taylor, Richard. Destruction and Reconstruction. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955.









  



Reconstruction Blog
Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865
                    On March 3, 1865, the Freedmen’s Bureau Act was approved and signed by President Abraham Lincoln.  The Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865 established a Bureau for the relief of freedman, refugees, and abandoned lands.  The Bureau provided; “supervision and management of the abandoned lands; and the control of all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from rebel states, or from any district of country within the territory embraced in the operations of the army, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the head of the Bureau and approved by the President”.   The Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, directed by Secretary of War, would ensure clothing, fuel, shelter, employment, and supplies for freedmen, refugees and their families.  It further enacted funding for the Bureau.  Furthermore, it enacted the rights of loyal refugees and freedmen, the right to rent abandoned land of no more than forty acres, for a term of three years.  After viewing, the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, there seem to be several reasons the Bureau failed. 
 
Militarily the Bureau lacked force to back up its authority because most of the soldiers had been sent to the Western frontier.  For example, in the book Redemption, by Nicholas Lemann there are several instances in the coming years that the military force was not present to ensure the safety of the freedmen from the white supremacy.   Governor Albert Ames, of Mississippi, requested military enforcement in Vicksburg but was turned down.  Ames asked President Grant, “can there be any serious objection why troops can not be sent there…Will it not be the best (least?) of evils to have troops there for any emergency”.

Economically the country was already in turmoil from the effects the Civil War.  The Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865 was the first emergence of a welfare system.  The Bureau would finance the livelihood of freedmen and black as well as white refugees.  However, the Bureau wasn’t prepared for the staggering number of freedmen and refugees they would have to feed, cloth, provide schools for, healthcare, shelter, employment, and other services.  The success of schools from the Freedmen’s Bureau was one of the positive effects the act had economically.

Socially and politically the Southern whites were not ready to accept Southern blacks as equals.  There are several instances in which the white southern were hostile to the Bureau members that were there to restore peace and prosperity and whites southerners were even more hostile toward freedmen.  The Freedmen’s Bureau did not distribute the land properly like was intended because of disloyal Bureau workers sympathized with the white southerners.  The Bureau failed politically because white and black southerners could not get the help needed from Northern and Southern politicians.

                    However, good intentions of Radical Republicans, the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865 fails because the task of integrating Southern blacks and Southern whites from a society based on slavery to one of freedom was not accomplished.  It wasn’t until several years of tweaking the Act and the addition of the 14th and 15th Amendments that some of the social equalities that the Republicans wanted to accomplish actually started to happen.  Eric Foner writes it was “an experiment in social policy that did not belong to the America of its day”.
                                                                  Cited Works
Freedman’s Bureau Act of 1865.  U.S. Statutes at Large (38th Cong., Sess. II, Chp. 90, p. 507-509)
Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution. New York: Harper and Row, 1988.
Lemann, Nicholas. Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2006. xi + 257 pp.

Freedmen’s Suffrage

The journal article, Reconstruction and Negro Suffrage, questions whether the rebellious states can question the federal government in regards to freedmen’s suffrage. According to the author, E. P. Whipple, the states in question had no say in the matter. He stated, “President Johnson has just the same right to say that negroes shall vote as to say that pardoned Rebels shall vote.” Whipple thought that only loyal states had a right to decide on voting qualifications. He did not think that qualifications such as education should be applied because then we would be putting the governmental controls back into the hands of the ex-confederates.

I also found the point at the beginning of the article very interesting. Whipple pointed out that although there were some people in the rebellious states that remained loyal to the Union there what no way to separate them from those who were not. I personally had not factored in those who had remained loyal and what would happen with them in terms of reconstruction. Whipple made the point that since there was no way to separate loyal from disloyal, all of the people of the rebellious states would be treated the same, and re-admitted back into the Union the same way as well. This was just something I had never factored in before and found interesting.

I agree with Whipple’s thoughts on the matter. If during the reconstruction period the United States government had left the rebellious states to fend for themselves and decide whether or not their state would allow the freedmen to vote or even to enact voting qualifications the freedmen would have continued to be oppressed by the ex-confederates. I agree that the voting qualifications did need to be in the hands of the federal government.

Through out the article I did see some political motives behind his reasoning; that being that the freedmen’s vote was needed for the Republican Party. He said, “we cannot safely give them anything which approaches a republican form of government, unless we allow the great mass of the free people the right to vote.” To me this says that they loyalist was not concerned with the equality of freedmen being able to vote; partly because they wanted to be able to decide if they could in the North and partly because they wanted to ensure there were enough Republican Votes among the rebellious to states to develop a Republican Government. A government they wanted to form in order to prevent an army occupation.

In this article I do agree that the rebellious states should not have had the decision as to whether the freedmen would be allowed to vote or not, but I do not agree with some of the reasoning behind it. Although the abolitionist may have had the right reasoning a lot of people did not. I though that this article was very interesting and brought out a lot of points I wouldn’t have thought of otherwise.

Source: Whipple, E.P.,  The Atlantic monthly, 

Friday, April 26, 2013

The Use of Militray Force to Protect the Gains of Reconstruction


            The occupation efforts of the Union troops in southern states after the Civil War cannot be overlooked as a significant step in U.S. history. The military presence disbanded voter intimidation towards the newly freed blacks in the south. The newly freed African Americans found it possible to not only participate in the U.S. political system at the polls but for some to achieve highly regarded political status during the 1860’s and early 1870’s. The number of African Americans who played such roles is astounding. After the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 there were 1,500 blacks who served in Congress, State Legislatures, sheriffs, tax assessors, or other local offices. The short amount of time that these actions to hold is also surprising, only a few years before these same individuals were not only denied political participation but many were enslaved. The success of freed blacks in the south was a direct result of the military intervention at voting polls and also a general overseer of peace in southern communities.            

            However, the public opinion of military presence in the southern states and with some northern republicans began to diminish. Many saw the military intervention in the southern political events as being an opposition to the democratic system of government that the U.S. was founded on, which in turn resulted in a strong feeling of resentment towards the African Americans who had been elected to political office. This was the cry of the White Redeemers of the south, who claimed that military intervention in the political process violated the foundation of the federal government. “By 1876, it was not unusual for even moderate Republicans to question whether state governments deserved to exist if they could not be maintained without military force…rule by the ballot instead of rule by the bayonet.” The overwhelming public opinion and declaration of faulty elections, economic dilemmas, and availability of troops pushed President Rutherford B. Hayes to withdraw the troops in 1877. The removal of the troops satisfied the general public opinion, but placed the necessity of black suffrage aside for a hundred years.

            The economic dilemmas during the years of reconstruction were factors that affected the opinion towards maintaining military occupation in the south. The economic “panics” or recessions in 1873 and 1877 promoted the ideas of the public that military presence in the south was not a high priority any longer and funding these efforts were seen as unnecessary. In the closing years of Reconstruction the need for troops in the south was also viewed by government officials and military generals as being less important. Their views favored the idea that more troops were needed in the western plains fighting the Native Americans. The need for western expansion and settlement of new territories trumped the troop’s occupancy in the southern states.

            The military forces in the southern states did have success in maintaining order at political events especially in the presidential election of 1876, in which President Grant sent troops to Petersburg, Virginia to provide blacks the chance to vote. However, the number of troops needed to oversee all areas of the south was impractical, especially with the beginning of the Plains Wars. The lack of troops allowed for mass killings of blacks in the south some by ex-confederates and the majority of the violence coming from Klu Klux Klan. To keep the peace throughout the south entirely was impossible for the number of troops available, and in order to do so the number of troops had to double the amount of troops present.

            The military occupation of the southern states during Reconstruction allowed newly freed blacks to live as American Citizens. The military occupation provided a reassurance of two things, the union was once again united and slavery was ended forever in the U.S. Yet, the efforts of the Union troops, turned policing forces, were short lived and the removal of troops in 1877 would allow the blacks rights to fade for a century. The overwhelming dismissal of the troop’s occupation in the south and economic problems forced the removal of the troops, and a relapse of black rights.
Blair, William. " The Use of Military Force to Protect the Gains of Reconstruction." Civil War History 2005: 388-402

Thaddeus Stevens and the 14th Amendment


It is, of course, no surprise that a radical Republican such as Thaddeus Stevens would have taken a major interest in post-war reconstruction. I came upon a speech given by Stevens on the House floor (1866) in regards to the final draft of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the speech, he stressed the importance of the amendment for making a large leap towards equality. Yet, he also addressed his reservations about the amendment concerning the reentrance of the southern states’ legislation back into congress.

“I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit that every one of these provisions is just.” Stevens used this line after he laid out the first section of the amendment. Of course, the first section guarantees equal protection of all people, regardless of color, under the law. (Hardly a new idea if one is at all familiar with the Declaration. I suppose that idea went by the wayside for African Americans, but I digress.) Stevens continued on in the speech to familiarize the congress on what exactly equal protection will guarantee and also his prediction for what would have happened if this amendment was not passed: years of severe oppression that would have caused “the death of the hated freedmen.”

One quote from this speech I found particularly interesting is, “…true it will take two, three, possibly five years before they [white people] conquer their prejudices sufficiently to allow their late slaves to become their equals at the polls…” This struck me as both ironic and sad because while, yes, the Fifteenth Amendment was passed in 1870, four years later, it was over a hundred years before African Americans were actually “equal” at voting polls. One could speculate that knowing that fact would have gravely disappointed Stevens and others like him.

Another reaction I have to this speech is that I find myself thinking about what could have been had Stevens gotten his way and the southern states had not been allowed back into the congress yet. Though now free in the eyes of the law, African Americans were still gravely oppressed for years. Black codes were “keeping them in their place” in several southern cities and eventually Jim Crow Laws and others like them had grave misrepresentations of “equality” in the United States. I feel as though these vile acts of legislation could have been prevented and other measures implemented to help sooner pull the freed slaves to a level of social, educational, and economic equality.

Much like many other political leaders of the time, Stevens brings up religion multiple times throughout the speech. He talks about a “just God” not accepting such intolerance in the south and other times he evokes the name of God to shame the congress into passing this bill. I always found it interesting that both sides were so sure they had God on their side. For years the white south would use religion to justify slavery while northern abolitionists used religion to argue the injustice of slavery. Of course, these religious conversations carried on into reconstruction.

Stevens was clearly looking for a total bolstering of equal opportunity. His entire speech was centered around his lack of prejudice and eagerness for a society ready to accept these new measures and more like them. Stevens was clearly a very impassioned man when it came to matters of equality. He was inarguably a very influential man throughout the war and after, and he can surely be credited as a great force for racial equality and progressivism.

 

Stevens, T. (1866). Congressional Speech. In H. Hyman, The Radical Republicans and Reconstrction (1967) (pp. 318-325). Indianapolis: University of Illinois.          

The New Oppression - The Black Codes of 1865-1866


The Civil War is over; the initial aim of the war has changed, and the previously enslaved peoples are now free, courtesy of the 13th Amendment.  The South has been stripped of its most intrinsic institution; and many are outraged. That explains many people’s attitudes regarding the newly freed slaves in southern territories. Due to President Johnson’s plan for Reconstruction, many of the ex-Confederates that held power at the height of the war could now regain some footing in the political spheres of their states. These two facts led to the actions that would attempt to put a harness on the newly freed slaves; these were the black codes.

The black codes were a term used for policies adopted across many of the southern states after the slaves had been freed and reconstruction began. Many of the “higher-ups” in southern society were busy holding conventions to make new policies to repress those new slaves, and due to their newly found freedom, the policy makers had to create some extremely creative means to make an attempt to subjugate the blacks without much ruckus.

Of all the southern states, Mississippi is most commonly known for its use of the black codes, and in many cases is cited as having the harshest stipulations on the ex-slaves. These new rules would compel the freed slaves to remain under the watchful eye of their past masters. The first section of these policies was to force blacks to be unable to lease any land if it wasn't in either a town or city. The second part of this particular policy enacts rules that force all black people(s) to have a lawful home or proof of employment from local authorized officials. This pushed the newly freed black people into a very difficult corner. Given than many of the pieces of land within the towns and cities would be well out of the pay grade of the backs, it forces them to take upon work, most likely under someone they know. One of the most staggering pieces of legislation passed was that of “An Act to Regulate the relation of Master and Apprentice.” This rule alone makes sure that many of the children of former slaves would remain under the control of previous owners of the parent, or said child. It was also extremely frowned upon for any person to assist any of these children (who may range to nearly 18 years of age) in running away, by providing shelter, food, or even clothing. It is my belief, that this was simply an act in order to retain free labor from former slaves by their owners.

However, this is just the case in Mississippi, these rules stretched across the south, and even though Mississippi is known for its harsh laws against the slaves, South Carolina had just as bad, if not worse laws in place to diminish the prowess of the blacks. One of the South Carolina’s legislation's more prominent clauses concerns the sale of farming products. This law stated that any black person living on a farm couldn't sell the fruits of their labor without written authority. The punishment was to be fined, and if the fine was not paid immediately, the penalty would be a beating. In the following year, 1966 Florida passed new laws in similar fashion to these. Many of the punishments for breaking the Floridian law were to be punished by essentially slave labor to pay for their actions. Almost all of the states had a ways to keep black people from becoming prominent or even successful in the states in which they resided. Many of the blacks had to partake in sharecropping with former masters for very little pay or compensation.  There was very little that blacks could do in the way of making a living or even a comfortable life. Many were considered vagrants and were simply put in jail for doing little-to even in some cases, no crime. No matter how you look at the pieces of legislation, you can clearly see that it was an attempt to hold on to slavery in any way possible in the face of their freedom.


Wilson, Theodore Brantner. The Black Codes of the South. University: University of Alabama Press, 1965.

Andrew Johnson’s Veto of Freedmen’s Bureau Bill






In 1866 Republicans had allied upon Lyman Trumbull's Freedmen's Bureau and the Civil Rights bills as necessary amendments to the success of the Unions Reconstruction.  Republican radicals viewed them as necessary measures to move toward a rudimentary change needed, and a prelude to readmitting the South back into Congressional representation.  Although Johnson’s hostility to the Freedmen’s Bureau was known among his fellow republicans and union party, his Veto of the bill was a shock for him to break away from his party’s majority vote.  In the meantime, a never-ending stream of complaints, were being sent to Washington.  The accusation of mistreatment from Southern blacks and white loyalists were corrupting the mood in Congress by breaking down the integrity of Johnson’s central assumption-that the Southern states could be trusted to manage their own affairs without federal supervision.
On February 19, 1866, President Andrew Johnson addressed the United States Senate, with his Veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill.  In Johnson’s Veto, he addressed congress and said, “ I share with Congress the strongest desire to secure to the freedmen the full employment of their freedom and property and their independence and equality in making contracts for their labor, but the bill before me contains provisions which in my opinion are not warranted by the constitution and are not well suited to accomplish the end in view.”[1]  Fair labor had been a part of the plans for Reconstruction since Abraham Lincoln first proposed his plan.  Johnson just felt that the Bill gave the freedmen and refugees more than the constitution garnered them to be provided by the government.
Other reservations Johnson stressed about the Freedmen’s Bill, was a question of it’s timing and the opposition of the Bills plans to set up military jurisdiction in the areas in the White South and other regions containing refugees and freedmen.  In Johnson’s speech to congress he said, “This bill proposes to establish by authority of Congress military jurisdiction over all parts of the United States containing refugees and freedmen.  It would by its very nature apply with most force to those parts of the United States in which the freedmen most abound, and its expressly extends the existing temporary jurisdiction of the freedmen’s bureau, with greatly enlarges powers over those states.”[2]  Because of these questions Johnson leans amendments for how he would see the bill succeed, “The subjects over which this military jurisdiction is to extend in ever part of the United States include protection to ‘all employees, agents, and officers of this bureau in the exercise of the duties imposed’ upon them by the bill.”[3]

Also other questions arose, for example the duration of the legislation, concerns about ill-treatment from Ex-masters, concerns of due process of law, and in which ways the bill would injure the freedmen themselves.   In his speech Johnson speaks about the constitution and due process for all men, “While the territory and the classes of the actions and offenses that are made subject to this measure are so extensive, the bill itself, should it become a law, will have no limitation in point of time, but will form a part of the permanent legislation of the country.  I can not reconcile a system of military jurisdiction of this kind with the words of the Constitution which declare that ‘no person shall be held to answer for a capitol or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury…”[4]   About the mistreatment of Freedmen and refugees by ex-masters Johnson says, “Undoubtedly the freedmen should be protected, but he should be protected by civil authorities, especially by the exercise of all the tile constitutional power on the courts of the United States and of the States.”[5]  Johnson felt that the states and local authorities could handle the mistreatment without it becoming a federal problem.
Andrew Johnson concludes his Veto petitioning the Senate to not pass the Bill into a law without consideration of the people and a sanctioned judgment by the people.  And in the end the Bill came within two votes of having the two-thirds majority for it to be passed.  Johnson may have won the Veto but ultimately it ended his Presidency.


[1] Andrew Johnson, Veto of Freedmen’s Bureau Bill,  (1866; Washington: n.p. reprint 2009.), 1.
[2] Andrew Johnson, Veto of Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, 2.
[3] ibid.
[4] Andrew Johnson, Veto of Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, 3.
[5] Andrew Johnson, Veto of Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, 7.